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Abstract
This paper studies the economic conditions under which a government chooses to
disseminate information among its creditors. The government receives private informa-
tion about economic output and provides public information, either implicitly by the
actions it takes, or explicitly by communicating the true value of output. In a dynamic
model of endogenous sovereign default, I find that the government prefers to be more
transparent when it has lower debt, expects a lower drop in output, and the probabil-
ity of receiving a low output is higher. A higher probability of a recession lowers the
bond price and brings the optimal borrowing to a level where a transparent govern-
ment can repay even if it receives a low output. Hence, higher borrowing costs, due to
higher default risk, make the government to choose more transparency. The result is
supported by empirical evidence for OECD. I find that an increase in borrowing cost
(proxy for increase in likelihood of recession) by 1% is associated with a future increase
in information transparency by 6%.
JEL classification: E44,E02,F34,D80
Key words: endogenous default, asymmetric information, transparency, OECD.
∗Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Pedro Gomes, Manuel Amador, Davide Debortoli, Hernan
Seoane, Stefan Niemann, Matthias Kredler, Vivien Lewis, Fabio Kanova and Heiner Schumacher. I am also
grateful to seminar participants in the UC3M workshops; KU Leuven seminar; MACFINROBODS Paris
Conference; for their comments and feedback. The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement
Integrated Macro-Financial Modeling for Robust Policy Design (MACFINROBODS, grant no 612796). Any
errors are mine. E-mail address: olga.croitorov@kuleuven.be
1
1 Introduction
Government transparency is an important characteristic in guaranteeing fiscal discipline
and reducing economic uncertainty. There is a significant body of literature showing the
negative effects of a lack of transparency. Among others, Gelos and Wei (2005) provide
evidence that less transparent countries receive less investment and that during a crisis they
are more likely to experience high capital outflows.1 Marques et al. (2013) document that
more opaque countries suffer more from financial globalization. Several economic crises have
been partially worsened by a lack of transparency. For instance, in the late 90’s Asian crisis,
the Thai government was accused of allowing an extremely opaque financial sector to flourish,
which is considered to be one of the key elements that triggered the financial turmoil of 1997.
A decade later, in one of the worst recessions since The Great Depression, hidden debts of
the Greek government added more panic to already vulnerable sovereign bond markets in
2009-2010.
Even though much evidence suggests that opaqueness has negative effects, there are still
governments that choose to provide less transparent information about the economy’s stance.
A recent policy paper by the IMF2 estimated that 23% of the unexpected increase in general
government debt was due to incomplete information about the government’s underlying
fiscal position. In the present paper, I build a model that analyzes the conditions in which
governments prefer to hide information about economic output, and in which they choose
full disclosure. In particular, I focus on such macroeconomic aspects as public debt, the
probability of a recession and the severity of the expected economic downturn.
I develop a dynamic model of endogenous sovereign default with private information. I
assume a small open economy that lasts for three periods and is inhabited by a representative
household, a government that can borrow in an external credit market, and a continuum
of foreign risk-neutral lenders. At the beginning of the first period, the government decides
whether to credibly disclose private information about economic output. Next, nature draws
the endowment that the government will receive in the next few periods and the latter,
depending on its transparency decision, reveals it publicly or not.
The government smooths consumption by selling one-period bonds in the credit market
or defaulting on the accumulated debt. The market is not perfect due to the government’s
private information and contingent debt servicing. Therefore, the borrowing cost contains
a risk premium reflecting the risk that the latter may renege on its contractual payments.
Lenders update their beliefs about the government receiving a high endowment and repaying
1See Gande and Parsley (2014), Bernoth and Wolff (2008), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), Alt et al. (2006),
etc., for different aspects of economy that can be affected by lack of transparency.
2approved by Cottarelli (2012)
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its debt based on the government’s defaulting or borrowing decisions.
The government that expects a high output is better off if lenders know the true state
and offer a high bond price. The government that expects a low output would like to mimic
the former’s behavior so that it can borrow an amount that would otherwise be unaffordable.
Since the commitment regarding disclosure of the economy’s future state is made before it
is known, the government faces a trade-off: greater transparency increases the benefits in
good economic times, but leaves it without additional funds when it needs them the most.
Therefore, one would expect that opaqueness is especially tempting when the probability of
a recession is higher.
In the present paper, contrary to this intuition, I show that the government prefers to be
less transparent when it is more likely to receive a high output, and commits to fully disclose
private information when it expects the economy to be in a recession.
If the probability of receiving a low output is high, uninformed lenders increase the cost
of borrowing. As a result, the optimal amount of debt under zero transparency is close to the
one that the government can borrow during the recession if it truthfully reveals the economy’s
state. Therefore, it prefers to be fully transparent when the probability of a recession is high
in order to enjoy higher consumption if it eventually receives a high endowment.
If a recession is less likely, the government is better off by being less transparent. When
the probability of a bad economic state is lower, the price offered by foreign lenders increases
and the amount of debt that a non-transparent government can borrow is higher. As a
result, the expected loss in welfare if the economy is booming almost vanishes, while the
gains if it is in recession increase. However, the lower the level of initial debt, the lower is
the government’s preference to be opaque. A less financially constrained government gains
less from mimicking the behaviour of a booming economy. Given that the likelihood of
experiencing a recession is also low, the expected welfare of the government before observing
the economy’s future state is higher if it is fully transparent.
Positive correlation between level of debt and transparency has been documented in
several empirical papers (see Alt and Lassen (2006), Cottarelli (2012)). However, empirical
literature is still silent about the effects of the change in likelihood of an economic recession
on the level of government information transparency.
In the last section I corroborate the theoretical findings with empirical evidence. The
theoretical model shows that when the probability of a recession increases - which translates
into higher sovereign bond cost - the government prefers to be more transparent. Hence, I
test if an increase in sovereign bond yield is associated with an increase in future government
information transparency. Using data for OECD countries for the 1980-2010 period, I find
a positive relationship between the two. More precisely, an increase of 1% in bond yields
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raises the future information transparency index by 6%.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. The vivid interest about optimal
transparency dates back to at least Kydland and Prescott (1977). Most of the literature (see
for instance Walsh (2007), Stein (1989)) focused on the optimal disclosure of information
about monetary policy targets by central banks. This paper differs from the latter as it
looks at real, rather than monetary variables, and information friction relates to economic
fundamentals, rather than policy instruments.
Another strand of literature that is related to optimal government transparency comprises
the probabilistic voting models studied by Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) and political agency
models represented by Besley and Smart (2007). Their models focus on voters that do not
observe the electoral promises and competition among different political parties. Gavazza
and Lizzeri (2009) find that transparency on the expenditure side is welfare improving, while
on the revenue side it can be counterproductive. Besides the fact that I study the relationship
between the government and foreign lenders, I also focus on the underlying conditions of a
lack of transparency rather than its beneficial effects.
The present paper is most closely related to Albornoz et al. (2014). Similar to this paper,
the authors analyze the conditions under which the government finds it optimal to reveal
information about economic output. They focus, however, on domestic market distortions
like taxes and monopoly power. The authors show that whenever distortions are high enough,
the government is willing to hide the information during bad times in order to countervail
the negative effects that are coming from them. Hence the mechanism that affects the
government’s decision to be transparent is different from the one described in the present
paper.
The benchmark model builds upon models of endogenous sovereign default started by
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). It is closely related to Sandleris (2008) who studies a model
where the government has private information about economic fundamentals. The author
explains why sovereigns choose to repay, suggesting that by repaying their debt, governments
can signal their good type. Contrary to Sandleris (2008), this paper studies the conditions
under which the government chooses to be transparent. Other papers that include asymmet-
ric information in models of endogenous sovereign default are Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005)
and D’Erasmo (2008). They present infinite horizon models where the government has pri-
vate information about its type. In their models, governments differ in their patience level.
D’Erasmo (2008) aims at replicating the debt levels that are observed in the data. Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2005) study a model of adverse selection to show that delaying the default
decision often exacerbates the recession. Contrary to the model studied in this paper, the
government is only allowed to borrow an exogenously given amount of debt. Also, none of
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Table 1: Environment
t=0 t=1 t=2
• Gov. starts with endowment y0, • Gov. receives endowment yi, ∀i ∈
{c, b},
• Gov. chooses to default or repay.
• Gov. chooses level of transparency
{FT,NT},
• Gov. decides whether to default or
not; and issues new debt if it repays,
• Gov. learns future endowments yt,
∀t ∈ {1, 2},
• Lenders update their beliefs by ob-
serving default or demanded debt; and
revise price schedule.
• Lenders set price schedule,
• Gov. borrows from foreign lenders.
these papers has the feature of optimal information choice to be revealed to other parties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I set up the theoretical model in section 2.
In sections 3 and 4, I characterize the equilibrium and explain the main results of the paper.
Section 5 provides empirical evidence that corroborates the theoretical findings discussed
earlier.
2 Model
I develop a simple setting of a small open economy, where the world’s interest rate, rt, is
taken as given. The economy is inhabited by a representative household, a government and
a continuum of risk-neutral competitive foreign lenders. The model includes two frictions:
the sovereign issues only one-period non contingent bonds; and it has private information
about its future fundamentals, yt. The economy lasts for 3 periods, t = 0, 1 and 2. The
summary of the general environment is listed in table 1.
2.1 Environment
The household maximizes the expected utility of consumption over the 3 periods:
max
{ct}t=0,1,2
E0
∑
t=0,1,2
βtu(ct),
where the utility function, u(c), is strictly increasing, weakly concave and twice differentiable,
and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Every period, the household consumes the observed
endowment and a transfer received from the government. The household is not allowed
to participate in the credit market, therefore the government smooths its consumption by
acting on its behalf and transferring the proceedings from credit market operations.
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The government starts with an endowment y0 and a signal that nature draws about the
future state of economy. The signal is perfectly informative for the government and it reveals
the future stream of endowments (i.e. the future state of economy). Lenders only know the
distribution of fundamentals: a low state, yc ("crisis"), with probability λ and a high state,
yb ("boom"), with probability (1 − λ), where 0 < yc < yb and λ ∈ (0, 1). The economy
permanently stays in the initially drawn state starting from period t = 1. Besides making
the analysis easier, this assumption resembles the persistence of output that is observed in
real world economies.
Before observing the signal about the future states, the sovereign decides whether to
be fully transparent (FT ) and reveal the information about the fundamentals to foreign
lenders. Although it can decide to be non-transparent (NT ), the economy’s state may still
be revealed through the actions that the government takes, specifically the default decision
and the level of debt it demands.
The debt is not enforceable, therefore the sovereign may choose to renege on its debt
by comparing the benefits from the two states, default and repayment. If it defaults, the
government is not allowed to participate in the credit market any longer and bears an
additional cost in the form of lower future utility, V Def < V NDef . This is a classical approach
to explain the government’s willingness to repay its debt (see Eaton and Fernandez (1995),
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005)). In addition, Mendoza and Yue (2012) show that a model
with endogenous default costs, in terms of output, has quantitatively similar results. If the
sovereign repays, it decides upon the new level of debt.
The foreign lenders are willing to buy any amount of bonds as long as the expected returns
equal the profits received by trading in the outside risk-free market. Since the government
may default, the price offered by lenders, qt, reflects the likelihood of the government reneging
on its outstanding debt contract. When the government is fully transparent, lenders do not
face any uncertainty and hence the interest rate does not include any risk premium for
default. When the government chooses to be non transparent, lenders update their beliefs
about the state of economy, pit, by observing the repayment decision and the amount of newly
contracted debt. There is only one piece of private information. Hence, the government’s
actions will either reveal the true state of the economy or leave the lenders’ beliefs unchanged.
2.2 Government
The government maximizes the households’ utility. It participates in the foreign credit
market to smooth consumption over time. It sells in period t one period non-contingent
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bonds at price qt and repays next period the face value, bt+1.3 The debt is non-enforceable
and the government may decide to default. If it defaults, the economy’s resource constraint
in period t is:
ct = yt.
If it repays the debt, it consumes:
ct = yt − bt + q(bt+1)bt+1.
It is convenient to solve the problem backwards, by writing the government’s problem
starting in the last period. At the beginning of period t = 2, the government receives the
endowment yi depending on the state i ∈ {b, c} drawn at t = 0. If it defaults or has defaulted
in the previous period, it only consumes the available endowment and suffers a cost in the
form of lower future utility, V Def . If it repays, it consumes the net endowment and has a
higher residual future value. Let Di,t be the debt level where the government is indifferent
between defaulting and repaying in period t. Then, the government’s utility is given by:
Vi,2 =
{
u(yi − bi,2) + βV NDef if bi,2 ≤ Di,2
u(yi) + βV
Def if bi,2 > Di,2
At time t = 1, the sovereign makes two decisions: whether to default on the outstanding
debt, and, if it repays - to choose the new level of debt. The government enters in period
t = 1 with output yi and debt contracted in the previous period, bi,1. Utility is given by:
Vi,1 =
{
u(yi − bi,1 + qi,2(bi,2)bi,2) + βVi,2 if bi,1 ≤ Di,1
u(yi) + β(u(yi) + βV
Def ) if bi,1 > Di,1,
In period t = 0, the government makes two sequential decisions depending on the in-
formation it has at hand. Firstly, it chooses whether to be transparent or not, and then
it decides upon the optimal level of debt. I abstract from the trivial case of default in the
first period and assume that the government starts with zero debt. Note, however, that the
initial endowment y0 can be interpreted as the net output after repaying the outstanding
debt. A lower y0 is equivalent to a high initial debt. I adopt this interpretation for further
discussion.
At the beginning of the first period, the government knows y0, the probability distribution
of the future states and the price function (which will be described below). It maximizes the
3b > 0 implies a positive amount of debt.
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value over the three periods and chooses whether or not to reveal the information:
V0 = max{V FT0 , V NT0 }, (1)
where V j0 , j ∈ {FT, NT} is given by:
V j0 = max
bji,1
E
{
u(y0 + q
j
i,1(b
j
i,1)b
j
i,1) + βV
j
i,1(yi, b
j
i,1)
}
, i ∈ {b, c}.
The decision is taken before observing the state in which it will be tomorrow, therefore the
government takes expectations over the endowment set.
Afterwards, it observes the future endowment and, given the commitment it made in
the previous step, decides the level of debt. The sequence of events and decisions can
be visualized in the timeline below, where the variables above the line show the available
information, and below the line - the decisions that the government takes at each point of
time.
t = 0
y0
FT or NT
yi
bi,1 t = 1
2.3 Lenders
The foreign lenders are risk neutral, act competitively and can lend or borrow any amount
in the outside market at the risk-free interest rate, r. They do not observe the realization of
the endowments. Instead, lenders know the future income distribution and can update their
beliefs about the economy’s state by observing the repayment decision and the amount of
newly contracted debt.
Let the lenders’ initial beliefs about the economy being in a boom, pi−1, equal the prob-
ability of receiving a high endowment, 1− λ. Given that the government repays the debt in
period t = {0, 1}, the lenders’ subjective probability observing a high endowment is updated
through Bayes rule:
pit =
pit−1 Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Db,t−1} ∩ {bt = bb,t}
)
pit−1 Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Db,t−1} ∩ {bt = bb,t}
)
+ (1− pit−1) Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Dc,t−1} ∩ {bt = bc,t}
)
(2)
. The numerator, Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Di,t−1} ∩ {bt = bi,t}
)
takes into account the probability of
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both facts: the government repaying the debt contracted in the previous period, bt−1 and
borrowing the optimal level bi,t, i ∈ {b, c}.
If the government defaults in period t, it finds itself in a permanent autarky and is
not allowed to borrow. As a result, lenders form beliefs only upon observing the default-
repayment decision:
pit =
pit−1 Pr
(
bt ≤ Db,t
)
pit−1 Pr
(
bt ≤ Db,t
)
+ (1− pit−1) Pr
(
bt ≤ Dc,t
) (3)
.
In period t = 2, the government does not contract any debt, therefore beliefs are formed
upon observing the repayment decision, as in eq. (3).
For the full characterization of the problem, it is necessary to specify the beliefs off
the equilibrium path. I assume that, whenever the government finds it optimal to default
regardless of the economic state, the latter is assumed to be in a boom.
Assumption 1. Lenders beliefs off the equilibrium paths are:
pit = 1 if Pr({bt−1 ≥ Db,t−1}) = Pr({bt−1 ≥ Dc,t−1}) = 1.
Lenders are competitive, therefore the price is determined by the zero profit condition.
They brake-even when the expected repayment, discounted at the risk-free rate, equals the
value of debt. Therefore, given the lenders’ beliefs, the price is given by the expected
probability of the repayment weighted by the likelihood of the economy being in one of each
state. It follows from the following equality:
qtbt = pit
Pr({bt < Db,t})
1 + r
bt + (1− pit)Pr({bt < Dc,t})
1 + r
bt (4)
. If assets are negative bt < 0 (i.e. the government saves) then the price equals the price of a
risk-free asset. If the government is expected to default on debt in both states, lenders offer
a zero price and the only sustainable level of debt is bt = 0. If the government is expected
to default in one of the states, the price is lower than the risk-free one. As will be discussed
further, the government is going to default only during the bad states. Therefore, under
null transparency the government will overpay for the issued debt in the economy’s good
state and will underpay in the bad one. This trade-off ensures that for some conditions, the
government is willing to reveal the economy’s state and for some conditions it is willing to
be opaque.
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The competitive equilibrium of this economy can be defined as following:
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium is: (i) a set of beliefs updating functions pi∗t
∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2}; (ii) a set of bond prices q∗1 and q∗2; (iii) a set of borrowing b∗1 and b∗2; (iv) a set
of transparency decisions d∗ ∈ {FT,NT} such that:
1. b∗1, b∗2 and d∗ solve the government’s problem (2.2) given prices;
2. q∗1 and q∗2 are determined by market clearing condition (4);
3. beliefs pi∗t ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2} are consistent with Bayes rules (2) and (3).
The strategy of each player (government and lenders) is a mapping from one party’s
information set, that includes all the actions taken by the counterpart before its move, to
each player’s action set.
3 Equilibrium characteristics
3.1 Full Transparency
The only piece of private information is the economy’s future state. When the government
decides to commit to reveal the state, it can borrow at the risk-free rate any amount of
debt which is lower than the threshold Di,t. Since lenders perfectly observe the government’s
fundamentals, they will not lend above the level where the government can not repay the
next period. Hence, the debt is riskless. Under full information, due to the endowment
persistence, a government that receives a higher endowment is able to sustain a higher level
of debt to output.
3.2 Null Transparency
When private information is present, lenders cannot tell apart the state of the economy,
unless the sovereign takes any action to reveal it. Therefore, they charge a higher interest
rate, expecting that the economy is also likely to be in a recession. If the economy is in a
boom, the government would like to signal about the good state through the debt/default
decision so that it can enjoy lower interest rates. The government experiencing an economic
crisis would like to mimic the actions of being in a boom in order to take advantage of a lower
cost of borrowing and the possibility of borrowing a higher amount, which would otherwise
be unaffordable.
The following lemma shows that there exists a separating equilibrium, where the govern-
ment repays if it receives a high endowment and defaults otherwise.
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Lemma 3.1. The default threshold for the government during an economic boom is higher
than the one during a crisis, that is Db,t > Dc,t.
Proof: See Appendix.
Since there is only one piece of uncertainty, which is the endowment that the government
receives, the actions taken by the latter either reveal the economic state entirely or not at
all. Consequently, the lenders’ beliefs regarding the economy’s probability of being in a good
state will update to one if the actions are revealing or remain the same if they are not.
If the government chooses to be opaque and has not revealed the economy’s state so
far, lenders can discern the former’s state only by observing a default. The reason is the
following. The government can borrow in the following two regions: (i) the region where
the debt is lower than the threshold that the government in an economic crisis can repay
next period, bt < Dc,t; and (ii) the region where the debt is in between the two thresholds
of default, Dc,t < bt < Db,t. The government will not borrow more than it can repay in
the good state, since the price for debt bt > Dc,t equals zero. If the government contracts
a level of debt in region (i), in the next period it will repay independent of the received
endowment. If the government borrows in region (ii), it repays if the economy is in the
good state and defaults otherwise. Therefore, lenders will be able to know the economy’s
state only if the government defaults. The revelation through the chosen level of debt is
equivalent to choosing the full information. Note that it is the government that receives the
low endowment that would like to mimic the actions of it being in an economic boom. If it
borrows a level of debt that is different from the one that is optimal when the endowment
is high, then a priori the government is better off if it is transparent.
By the end of the game, in period t = 2, the government will reveal the economy’s state
entirely. However, the information is relevant only in the first two periods, t = 0, 1, as
in the last one the government does not borrow any more. Hence, even though the state
of the economy is revealed in equilibrium, lenders cannot affect any future debt decision.
The following three lemmas formalize each one of the observed equilibria under the null
transparency.
Lemma 3.2 (Separating Equilibrium). Suppose the government borrows b1 > Dc,1 in
period t = 0, then the economy’s state is revealed in period t = 1.
Let b1 > Dc,1, then the state that nature draws is fully revealed in period 1. The
government with a high endowment repays the debt , b1 < Db,1, and contracts any amount
of debt, b2 < Db,2 at the risk-free interest rate. The government with a low endowment
defaults and stays in permanent autarky.
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Lemma 3.3 (Pooling Equilibrium). Suppose the government borrows b1 < Dc,1 and b2 >
Dc,2, then the economy’s state is revealed in period t = 2.
Let b1 < Dc,1, and b2 > Dc,2, then the government, independently of the state, repays
the debt b1 < Dc,1 < Db,1 in period t = 1 and defaults in period t = 2 if it finds itself in a
recession. Since the government does not reveal the state in period 1, lenders carry on their
beliefs that the economy is in a bad state with probability 1− λ. As a result, a government
observing an economic boom will pay a higher cost for an amount of debt similar to the debt
level under full transparency; and the government receiving a low endowment will contract
the debt that otherwise would be unaffordable.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose the government borrows bt < Dc,t in any period t. Independently of
the state, the government repays the debt entirely and private information is not revealed.
However some of these equilibria are not sustainable. The following propositions establish
the conditions and the type of equilibrium that arises in the problem.
Proposition 3.5. If the government that observes a high endowment finds it optimal to
contract a debt level smaller than it can repay when it receives a low endowment, bb,t < Dc,t,
then it prefers to borrow bc,t 6= bb,t and reveal the received endowment.
Proof. Assume the government that enjoys a booming economy borrows the optimal level of
debt b∗b,1(yb) < Dc,1 and b∗b,2 < Dc,2. Given that the maximum amount of debt it can borrow
is the one it can repay next period, the government experiencing an economic crisis either
mimics the actions of being in a boom or borrows the optimal amount of debt available at
the risk-free rate. Since, b′2(b∗1) > 0 and b∗′1 (y) > 0, the government which receives a low
endowment yc < yb is better off by borrowing b∗c,1 < b∗b,1 and bc,2(b∗c,1) < bb,2(b∗b,1). 
The intuition is the following. Since during the boom the government finds it optimal
to borrow in the safe region, where the interest rate is (1 + r)−1, during the crisis it can
not borrow debt in the risky zone by mimicking the actions of being in a boom. In the safe
region the government that experiences a crisis can borrow any amount of debt at the risk-
free interest rate. Given that the utility function is convex and the endowment is persistent,
it is better off by borrowing a lower level of debt than it would during an economic boom.
Lemma 3.6. The government contracts a decreasing stream of debt over time if it plays the
Pooling Equilibrium, that is b1 > b2.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3.7. The Pooling Equilibrium is not sustainable.
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Proof. Assume there exists an equilibrium described in lemma 3.3 , and there exists an
optimal amount of debt b2 > Dc,2, b1 < Dc,1 and b1 > b2 by lemma 3.6. Then, in period
2, the government that receives a low endowment defaults, where the default threshold
Dc,1 = qb2 < b2. It follows immediately that b1 < Dc,1 = qb2 < b2. This is true only if
b1 < b2, which contradicts lemma 3.6. 
In the present model, the only type of equilibrium which is optimal to play under the null
transparency is the equilibrium that reveals the information in period 1, which is described
in lemma 3.2. The government during an economic crisis mimics the behavior of being in an
economic boom and contracts a high level of debt in the first period, on which it eventually
defaults. The government during a boom overpays for the debt borrowed in the risky region
and reveals the state of the economy by repaying the debt next period. Therefore, in the
second period it is able to borrow at the risk-free rate any amount below b2 < Dc,2. The
benefits from higher debt if the economy is in a crisis and the costs that come from lower
debt due to the higher interest rate paid by the government during good times generate the
trade-off that ensures the optimal level of transparency. In the next section, I will discuss
the conditions that determine the level of transparency.
4 Optimal Transparency
This section highlights the economic conditions under which the government chooses to be
opaque. I will analyze the results in the following three dimensions: the probability of
receiving a low output (λ), the initial endowment or the level of indebtedness (y0) and the
severity of the crisis (y/y¯). A summary of the results is presented in Figure 1. It depicts
the regions of the government’s commitment to be transparent about the economy’s future
state. The government prefers to hide the economy’s state when it has a higher initial debt,
expects a bigger drop in output, or the probability of being in a recession is lower.
It is rather intuitive that the government with higher debt would like to be less transpar-
ent about the received endowment. A government with high debt depends more on external
resources to finance its consumption. Lenders can offer a relatively better price during bad
times if they are uninformed, and therefore, the government can roll over higher amounts
of debt. It is also true that the government that experiences good times will have to pay a
higher cost for the same amount of borrowing. However, a transparent government will be
unable to roll over the debt if lenders know it is going to be in a recession. Therefore, since
the government that receives a high endowment will be able to repay the higher debt and to
smooth the consumption, it would a priori prefer to pay a higher cost during good times so
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Figure 1: Transparency Regions of the Parameter Space
Probability of crisis (λ)
In
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t (y
−b
0)
 
 
Null Transparency 
Full Transparency 
Severe Crisis
Crisis
Notes: The regions of full and null transparency (commitment) as functions of initial endowment, probability
of receiving a low endowment and the severity of crisis measured by y/y¯. As the last fraction decreases (crisis
is more severe), the region of null transparency shifts rightwards.
that it can borrow if a crisis, eventually, comes.
A similar story can be told about a government’s willingness to be non-transparent when
it expects a bigger drop in output. If the endowment is very low, the government’s ability
to repay the debt decreases. If the lenders were able to observe perfectly the bad economic
state, the government would not have been able to borrow much. Hence, the benefits from
mimicking the characteristic behavior of the good times are higher than the costs from paying
a higher interest rate and contracting a lower amount of debt if it eventually receives a high
endowment.
The government’s preferences to commit to reveal the economy’s state when the probabil-
ity of a crisis is high is less intuitive. It should be recalled that lenders know the probability
distribution of the states of the economy. Since this directly determines the borrowing cost,
the higher is the probability of a recession, the higher the debt cost will be. As a result,
the amount of debt that a non-transparent government finds optimal to contract during
economic boom is close to the debt threshold that it is able to repay during recession. Given
that during a recession, the non-transparent government can not benefit from mimicking the
behavior of being in a boom, and during a boom, the government is always better off when
lenders know the state, it prefers to be transparent if the probability of being in a recession
is high.
However, when the government is less likely to experience a crisis, lenders offer a better
price. The actual benefits from not being transparent increase, and likewise, its desire
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Figure 2: Benefits and Costs from playing the Null Transparency strategy
Probability of crisis (λ) 
 
Expected Benefits
Expected Costs
Benefits
Cost
(a) High debt at t = 0
Probability of crisis (λ) 
 
Expected Benefits
Expected Costs
Benefits
Cost
(b) Low debt at t = 0
Notes: The graphs show the gained and foregone welfare from lower transparency for different levels of
initial indebtedness (or the size of initial endowment). The dotted lines show the benefits/costs once the
government observes its state and the bold lines show the expected values weighted by the probability of
receiving the boom or crisis. The left panel shows the case of higher initial indebtedness, or lower y0. Graphs
are plotted for a given level of y/y¯.
to be opaque. At the same time, the lower the likelihood of a recession, the lower are
the expected benefits at the time when the government does not know the endowment,
and higher is the willingness to be more transparent. Therefore, the optimal transparency
decision additionally depends on the degree a government is financially constrained and the
severity of the potential crisis. As was mentioned above, when the government is initially
less indebted and/or expects the crisis to be less severe, it prefers to commit to reveal the
state of economy.
The actual and expected cost (benefit) graphs as functions of the probability of receiving
a low endowment are plotted in figure 2. The benefit is the surplus in welfare once the
government observes a low endowment and it chooses not to disclose it to the general public.
The cost is the foregone welfare if the government prefers to be opaque and, eventually,
receives a high endowment. Expected values are the benefits (costs) before nature reveals
the state, that is actual benefits (costs) weighted by the probability of receiving a low (high)
endowment.
Figure 2a depicts the cost and benefits of being non-transparent when the level of initial
indebtedness is high (y0 is low). When the government has high initial debt and experiences
a low probability of being in a recession, the discrepancies between the costs and benefits
from being opaque are very high. There are two effects going on. First, due to consumption
smoothing behavior, the government with high initial debt is willing to borrow a higher
15
amount of debt. Hence, the benefits from being non transparent in an eventual recession are
also high. Second, lower probability of a recession translates into lower borrowing cost, which
makes debt more attractive, further increasing the benefits. Additionally, an interest rate
approaching the risk-free rate allows the non-transparent government to borrow the amount
of debt that a government during a boom could borrow if it were transparent. Hence the
actual cost is almost zero while the benefits are high. Discrepancy between expected benefits
and costs, though, is smaller due to lower probability of an eventual recession. Hence, the
higher the level of initial indebtedness or the ratio of endowments between the two states,
the lower the actual surplus and the desire to be non-transparent will be.
Figure 2b shows the case when the government has a relatively low initial debt, and
the expected costs surpass the expected benefits from being non-transparent. Although the
actual benefits from being opaque are higher, the probability of a crisis event is so low that
the government is better off by committing to be fully transparent. The sudden jump to
zero depicts the point where the government that experiences a recession is better off by
revealing the economic state and contracting a lower level of debt. When the probability of
an economic crisis is high, the borrowing cost increases and the government that receives
a high endowment prefers a lower level of debt. Since the government is less financially
constrained, it prefers to smooth consumption and be able to borrow in both states rather
than defaulting on a level of debt that is marginally higher than its default threshold.
In figure 2a, a region can be observed in which the actual benefits surpass the costs, but
the expected benefits do not. In this region, the government that chooses to be transparent
has an incentive to renege on its commitment and mimic the behavior of a government
receiving a high endowment. However, I assume that it is hard to break the commitment.
One could think that the government can easily hide its state by providing less information,
but it is hard to manipulate it. Frequently, countries show their information transparency
commitment by adopting the internationally acknowledged regulations, like those developed
by IMF or World Bank, which are very difficult to breach unnoticed.
The mechanism above was observed in two distinct crisis events: in Thailand (1997) and
in Greece (2009). Both of these economies, before the crisis, enjoyed higher than average
regional and OECD GDP growth rates, low inflation and pegged exchange rates to strong
currencies: the US dollar, and the Euro respectively. As a result, they enjoyed low interest
rates which allowed them to accumulate an unsustainable level of debt. Further, as it wa
later revealed, they suffered from a lack of transparency in finance. Lower expectations about
an upcoming crisis allowed them to mimic a good economic stance and roll-over high levels
of foreign debt. However, once the regional and world economy had been hit by financial
shocks, growth slowed down and a series of irregularities and hidden transaction scandals
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Figure 3: Debt to GDP ratios
Probability of crisis (λ) 
 
Expected in NC
Expected in FC
Actual in Low NC
Actual in High NC
Actual in Low FC
Actual in High FC
Notes: The graph shows the averaged over periods debt-to-output ratios for different cases. “Low" stands
for the case in which a government receives low endowment, and “high", respectively the high. “Actual" shows
the debt-to-output ratio that a government has after it knows all the information. Expected values are the
weighted actual values by the probability of receiving a crisis/boom state.
emerged. As a result, governments had to default due to surging borrowing costs.
Figure 3 plots the average level of debt to output ratios for the expected and actual
state of economies. As it can be seen, the highest level of debt to GDP is attained by a
non-transparent bad economy. The lowest ratio is observed for the economy that is in crisis
if it is fully transparent. Therefore, an economy that expects a low endowment will always
be tempted to mimic the behavior of a government receiving a high endowment so that it
can enjoy a higher level of debt and eventually higher consumption. Consistent with findings
in the literature, the expected debt-to-GDP ratio is lower for a government that has better
information about the state of its economy.4 A similar result has been found in Gavazza
and Lizzeri (2009) in a principal-agent framework where voters have less information than
political parties.
Despite a higher level of debt that a non-transparent government can enjoy, it is not
always optimal for the government during a crisis to be non-transparent. A high probability
of crisis increases the cost of borrowing, and therefore increases the level of debt despite low
net inflows. As a result, the cost of foregone utility from failure of consumption smoothing
rises and the government in the bad state prefers full transparency.
4See for instance Alt and Lassen (2006) for a comprehensive analysis for 19 OECD countries; Cottarelli
(2012) for empirical evidence performed for different income groups.
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5 Transparency and creditor’s expectations
This section provides empirical evidence on the relationship between information trans-
parency and creditors’ expectations about the state of the economy. For this purpose, I
estimate a linear regression model using data for OECD countries. In line with the the-
oretical results, I find a positive relationship between the index of transparency and bond
yields.
The analysis of OECD countries is preferred for several reasons. In comparison to emerg-
ing markets developed countries have more stable economies and, therefore, they are less
prone to market fluctuations as a result of external shocks that affect bond yields. Further-
more, several developed countries have experienced an increase in sovereign bond yields due
to the risk of default, which is the main mechanism developed in the theoretical part. Hence,
in addition to longer available data series, OECD countries are also relatively homogeneous
across many dimensions and serve as a good approximation of the model set-up studied in
section 2.
The empirical model relies on two main variables: the market’s perception of the economic
situation and government transparency. To capture the first, I use the 10-year sovereign
bond yield, which is highly correlated with the economic fundamentals and reflects the
riskiness of government debt. Finding an appropriate measure of government transparency
is less straightforward. There is no universal agreement on the assessment of government
transparency and the literature proposes a variety of definitions, from the availability and
clarity of the budget process to the commitment to policy decisions.
The index used in the present paper has been developed by Williams (2015). It is
a composite index that captures the degree of government information transparency. Its
construction is based on a methodology that is similar to the one used for the Corruption
Perception Index. The index allows for comparison over a large time span and a large number
of countries. It uses 29 variables from 21 sources ranging from well-known institutions, as
well as measures constructed specifically for the study. The index reflects the amount of
information released by the government that is published in major international statistical
databases. It also includes the quality of information, that is the degree of the government’s
adherence to internationally accepted standards, and the government’s ability to spread and
communicate the information.
The data is annual and covers the period from 1980 to 2010. Summary statistics of the
data can be found in appendix C. The data contain observations for 29 countries, however
for a number of them, bond yield data is only available for later periods. Table 6 shows
the correlation of the transparency index (TI) with fundamental variables. In line with the
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Figure 4: Transparency Index and Previous period bond yield
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Notes: The graphs show the level of transparency index (red line, left axis) and the previous period 10Y
government bond yield (black line, right axis) in selected OECD countries.
19
existing empirical findings, countries that have higher transparency will also have lower bond
yields, lower debt and higher growth per capita.
Figures 4 depicts the behavior of TI and one-year lagged bond yields for selected devel-
oped countries during the two periods before and after 2003. In all of these economies, the
transparency index during the period of lower bond yields was decreasing. But it soared once
the lenders increased borrowing costs. Worsened credit conditions and higher bond yields
are associated with higher information transparency in the following year. This relationship
is especially pronounced during the earlier period when countries registered a relatively low
level of transparency overall, and there was a much higher room for improvement.
As it was shown in the theoretical model, when lenders expect a lower probability of
an upcoming recession, indebted governments are better off by being less transparent and
enjoying higher asset prices. However, once the probability of a crisis goes up and the cost
of rolling over the debt increases, a government chooses to play the transparent strategy.
In what follows, I describe the empirical model that studies the relationship between
transparency and market expectations. In order to take into account the time that a gov-
ernment needs to react to the market’s punishing behavior and make appropriate legislative
changes, the TI is regressed on the previous years bond yields. Additionally, this approach
minimizes the possible endogeneity that might exist between TI and bond yields.
Another variable of interest is the interaction between bond yields and a dummy for
countries that have lower transparency. Since the less transparent governments are more
likely to have worse fundamentals they are more likely to postpone the release of additional
information that might increase the borrowing cost. Therefore, I expect that sovereigns with
a lower transparency index, on average, will have a lower positive response as a result of an
increase in bond yields. I also test whether increasing debt amplifies the effect of soaring
bond yields. To control for unobserved heterogeneity I use the fixed effects model. The
model is given by:
TIi,t = β0 + β1bondi,t−1 + +β2bondi,t−2 + β3D(L)i,t−1 × bondi,t−1 + β5bondi,t−1 × debti,t−1
+β4D(L)i,t−1 + β5ControlV ars+ i,t (5)
where D(L) is a dummy if economies have a TI lower than the yearly average. Control
variables include the central government’s debt-to-GDP ratio5, deficit, log per-capita output
growth, and current account. I include most of the variables that contain the bond price
with a lag to take into account the fact that making significant changes in government ac-
5Estimation has also been performed for general government debt, but the results do not change signifi-
cantly, and data is available for considerably shorter periods.
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countability and information transparency needs approval by a legislative organ that requires
time.
Table 2: Results for the period 1980 - 2010.
Information Transparency Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bondi,t−1 0.720∗∗∗ 0.444∗ 0.499∗∗ 0.522∗∗
(0.276) (0.244) (0.243) (0.258)
bondt−2 0.385∗ 0.362∗ 0.369∗∗
(0.215) (0.186) (0.187)
D(L)i,t−1 × bondi,t−1 −0.161
(0.225)
D(L)i,t−1 −2.769∗∗∗−1.994
(0.910) (1.490)
bondi,t−1 × debti,t−1 −0.005∗ −0.005∗ −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
log(gpc)(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
deficit(-) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286 281 281 281
R2 0.395 0.397 0.466 0.467
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.353 0.413 0.412
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The estimation results for baseline specification and the full dataset are presented in
table 2. The sign of the control variables is reported next to the name. In line with the
existing literature (see for ex. Alt et al. (2006)) higher growth per capita, a lower deficit and
a positive current account balance are associated with higher transparency.
The first column reports the statistics of the relationship between the information trans-
parency index and lagged bond yields without including additional explanatory variables,
except the controls. The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant. Including addi-
tional dependent variables, as reported in subsequent columns, slightly decreases the effect of
the previous year bonds. However, cumulatively the effect of change in market expectations
on future transparency index is higher. The sign of the bond yields for both first and second
lag is positive and significant in all the specifications.
The sign of the interaction term between dummy for less transparent countries and bond
yields is negative as expected but not significantly different from zero. Hence, less transpar-
ent governments respond similarly to more transparent governments, that is an increase in
borrowing cost is associated with improvement in the transparency index.
It is also interesting to note that, among the countries that have a higher debt level, an
increase in bond yields leads to lower transparency. Hence the amount of debt out-weighs
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Table 3: Results OECD: Spreads
Information Transparency Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
spreadi,t−1 0.659∗∗ 0.307 0.642∗∗∗ 0.568∗ 0.119
(0.265) (0.291) (0.217) (0.307) (0.321)
spreadi,t−2 0.342 0.289
(0.234) (0.202)
D(L)i,t−1 × spreadi,t−1 0.137 0.432
(0.471) (0.435)
D(L)i,t−1 −2.945∗∗∗ −2.987∗∗∗ −2.764∗∗∗
(0.922) (0.976) (0.936)
spreadi,t−1 × debti,t−1 −0.005∗−0.004 −0.004 −0.005∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log(GPC)(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA (+) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
deficit (-) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 260 250 260 260 250
R2 0.277 0.291 0.383 0.383 0.379
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.254 0.336 0.334 0.327
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the government willingness to be transparent. This is in line with the theoretical results that
showed that, everything else equal, a government with higher sovereign debt provides less
information.
Given that the data for the whole period is not complete, and most of the data is available
from 1995, I report the results for the period 1995-2010 in table 9. Though the results
slightly change quantitatively, qualitatively they remain similar to the baseline estimation.
The coefficient on the first lag of bond yields is positive and significantly different from zero,
though the second lag does not seem to play a role in the later period.
5.1 Robustness
In order to check the robustness of the results, I perform several other estimations using
different specifications of the main variables. In particular, table 3 reports the coefficients of
the effect of spreads6 instead of the bond yields, and tables 4 and 10 report the results for
log specification of the benchmark model.
The results remain unchanged. The coefficients on bond yield spreads are still positive,
though in some specifications not significant. Particularly the effects are weakened when
adding the second lag.
6The spreads are computed as the difference between the bond yield of a country of interest and the bond
yield of the United States.
22
The log specification also shows a positive relationship between borrowing costs and
information transparency. The coefficients of log bond yields for the first lag are positive
and significant. However, the second lag does not show any particular correlation. An
increase in the bond yield by 1% leads to an increase in next year’s transparency index by
5.9%. An estimation on the sample that starts in 1995 delivers similar results.
Table 4: Results OECD
log(ITI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(bond)i,t−1 0.051∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023)
log(bond)i,t−2 0.020
(0.022)
D(L)i,t−1 × log(bond)i,t−1 −0.037
(0.024)
D(L)i,t−1 −0.040∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.014) (0.037)
log(bond)i,t−1 × debti,t−1 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
log(GPC)(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA (+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
deficit (-) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286 281 286 286
R2 0.373 0.369 0.455 0.464
Adjusted R2 0.334 0.328 0.406 0.412
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
6 Conclusion
The literature that studies the effects of government transparency on economic outcomes
highlights the beneficial effects of transparency. However, during several financial crises, we
witnessed distinct events when governments were opaque about their fundamentals. The
opaqueness of the financial sector in Thailand before the 1997 crisis, and more recent cases
like the hidden debts of local governments in Spain, the manipulation of statistics by the
Argentinian and the Greek governments show that there are cases when governments prefer
to be less transparent about the state of their economies. In the present paper, I highlight
different economic conditions that induce the sovereign to be more opaque about their fun-
damentals. In a model of endogenous sovereign default, I show that a government chooses
to be more transparent when it has lower debt, expects a lower drop in output, and the
probability of a recession is higher.
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When the probability of a recession is higher, the price offered by uninformed lenders
is very close to the one they offer to a government if it receives a low output. As a result,
the cost from being opaque almost vanishes, while the benefits if it is in a good economic
state increase. Therefore, a government that expects (along with lenders) an economic
downturn prefers to be more transparent about the economy’s state in order to enjoy higher
consumption by borrowing more in case it eventually ends up in a good state. The theoretical
result is supported by empirical evidence and I find a significant positive relationship between
borrowing cost and future transparency indicator.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Dc,2 < Db,2
By definition, Dc,2 and Db,2 satisfy the following equation
u(yc)− u(yc −Dc,2) = β(V ND − V D) = u(yb)− u(yb −Db,2). (6)
Since u′′(y) < 0 and u is decreasing in D2, from u(yb−Db,2)−u(yc−Dc,2) = u(yb)−u(yc)
it follows that Dc,2 < Db,2. 
Proof. Dc,1 < Db,1
By definition, Dc,1 and Db,1 satisfy the following equation:
u(yi−Di,1 + q(b2,i)b2,i) +βmax{u(yi− b2,i) +βV NDef , u(yi) +βV Def} = u(yi) +βV Defi,2 (7)
Assume, without loss of generality, that the level of optimal debt b2 is such that the
government in crisis borrows in period one as much as to be indifferent between defaulting
and repaying in the next period. Hence,
u(yc −Dc,1 + q(Dc,2)Dc,2) = u(yc), (8)
and Dc,1 = q(Dc,2)Dc,2. Due to concavity of the utility function, the condition 7 for the
government with high endowment becomes:
u(yb −Db,1 + q(Dc,2)Dc,2) = u(yb)− β(u(yb −Dc,2)− u(yb) + β(V NDef − V Def )) = 0 (9)
Given β(u(yb−Dc,2)− u(yb) + β(V NDef − V Def )) > 0, then from equation 9 follows that
Db,1 − q(Dc,2)Dc,2 > 0. Hence:
Db,1 > q(Dc,2)Dc,2 = Dc,1

B Proof of Lemma 3.6
The government solves the following problem when it is playing the pooling equilibrium:
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max
b1,b2
u(y0 +
1
1+r
b1) + βu(y¯ − b1 + 1−λ1+r b2) + β2u(y¯ − b2) + βV Ndef (10)
s.t. D1,c − b1 ≥ 0, (11)
where D1,c = qb2, as the government in crisis is not able to repay in period 3.
For, γ ≥ 0, the F.O.C. wrt to b2 is:
1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) + γ 1− λ
1 + r
= 0.
The following inequalities hold:
1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) ≤ 1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) + γ 1− λ
1 + r
= 0, (12)
and
u′(c1) ≤ β(1 + r)
1− λ u
′(c2). (13)
Let’s consider the case when the constraint is not binding, γ = 0, then
u′(c1) =
β(1 + r)
1− λ u
′(c2). (14)
Given β(1 + r) = 1, then β(1+r)
1−λ > 1 and u
′(c1) > u′(c2). Hence, y¯ − b1 + 1−λ1+r b2 < y¯ − b2 and
b1 > (1 +
1−λ
1+r
)b2 > b2.
Let’s consider the case when constraint is binding, γ > 0 and D1,c = b∗1 = qb2. By
definition of pooling equilibria, a government in good times finds it optimal to contract
b∗2 > D2,c. Let’s assume that the government in crisis finds it optimal to mimic a government
in boom and contracts the same level of debt. The government in crisis then consumes its
endowment in period 1 and defaults in period 2. Hence, the terminal value of utility in
period 2, equals to V Def . As a result, it has the following utility function:
V0(b
∗
1, b
∗
2) = u(y0 +
1
1 + r
b∗1) + βu(yc) + β
2u(yc) + β
3V Def .
Government in crisis can have the same stream of consumption if it consumes b2 = 0 and
hence not default in the last period. Therefore, the terminal value of consumption is V NDef >
V Def and the utility obtained by mimicking the government in boom is lower, V0(b∗1, b∗2) <
V0(b
∗
1, b2) = 0. As a result, the government in crisis finds it optimal to deviate and the
equilibrium when the constraint is binding is not sustainable.
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C Summary statistics
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Transparency Index overall 69.79 9.67 37 88 N = 865
between 5.80 59.03 80.22 n = 29
within 7.77 38.54 92.08 T-bar = 29.82
Bond Yield overall 6.89 3.29 1 17.66 N = 648
between 1.55 2.735 9.27 n = 29
within 2.89 1.02 15.81 T-bar = 22.34
Table 6: Correlation matrix
TI Bond Debt log(gpc)
TI 1.0000
Bond -0.1831* 1.0000
Debt -0.1415* -0.0861* 1.0000
log(gpc) 0.6891* -0.7596* -0.0117 1.0000
∗ - significant at 5% level
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Table 7: Summary of bond yield 10Y OECD
Country Name Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
Australia 9.08 3.57 31
Austria 5.45 1.68 21
Belgium 7.31 3.12 31
Canada 7.74 3.34 31
Chile 6.22 .47 6
Czech Republic 4.51 .79 10
Denmark 6.38 2.53 24
Finland 6.73 3.27 23
France 7.68 3.90 31
Germany 6.03 1.94 31
Greece 5.46 1.66 13
Hungary 7.61 .85 11
Iceland 4.94 .98 19
Ireland 8.34 4.11 31
Israel 6.11 1.51 14
Italy 6.45 3.14 19
Japan 2.73 1.84 22
Latvia 6.51 2.80 10
Luxembourg 4.68 1.57 14
Mexico 8.60 1.00 9
Netherlands 6.29 2.21 31
New Zealand 9.27 3.70 31
Norway 7.37 3.22 26
Poland 6.46 1.63 10
Portugal 5.67 2.31 17
Slovenia 4.51 .84 8
Spain 9.25 4.72 31
Sweden 6.96 3.23 24
Switzerland 3.95 1.25 31
United Kingdom 7.91 3.26 31
United States 7.10 2.97 31
Total 6.81 3.27 672
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Table 8: Summary of Information Transparency Index
Country Mean Std. Dev
Australia 79.96 3.91
Belgium 69.33 6.85
Canada 78.96 3.61
Chile 66.73 10.54
Denmark 66.06 6.15
Finland 75.83 3.96
France 73.23 4.95
Germany 75.4 5.22
Greece 60.53 7.88
Hungary 64.5 13.75
Iceland 65.83 6.80
Ireland 65.66 9.01
Israel 63.6 8.32
Italy 70.03 3.96
Japan 70.76 10.13
Latvia 69.15 7.55
Mexico 59.43 9.29
Netherlands 73.93 3.64
New Zealand 70.8 8.91
Norway 72.96 6.31
Poland 62.43 14.95
Portugal 66.3 8.19
Slovenia 74.25 8.85
Spain 67.96 7.19
Sweden 75.3 7.95
Switzerland 70.7 5.18
United Kingdom 77.93 6.25
United States 80.4 3.97
Total 70.13 9.47
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D Results for the period 1995-2010
Table 9: Model specification in levels
Information Transparency Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
bondi,t−1 0.784∗∗ 0.726∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗
(0.351) (0.382) (0.305) (0.350) (0.408)
bondi,t−2 0.058 0.083
(0.184) (0.167)
D(L)i,t−1 × bondi,t−1 −0.449 −0.201
(0.353) (0.301)
D(L)i,t−1 −3.021∗∗∗ −0.849 −1.773
(0.948) (1.876) (1.809)
bondi,t−1 × debti,t−1 −0.006∗−0.006∗ −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log(GPC)(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA (+) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
deficit (-) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 260 250 260 260 250
R2 0.281 0.299 0.390 0.410 0.391
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.261 0.342 0.358 0.338
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 10: Model specification in logs
log(ITI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(bond)i,t−1 0.047∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
log(bond)i,t−2 −0.007
(0.011)
D(L)i,t−1 × log(bond)i,t−1 −0.026
(0.025)
D(L)i,t−1 −0.040∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.013) (0.039)
log(bond)i,t−1 × debti,t−1 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
log(GPC)(+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA (+) Yes Yes Yes Yes
deficit (-) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 260 250 260 260
R2 0.275 0.290 0.378 0.391
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.253 0.332 0.342
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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